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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In re the Marriage of:
Case No.: 20050374 CA
JANICE RIRIE KUNZ and
RICHARD L. KUNZ (deceased)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue #1: Did the lower court err in dismissing Janice
Kunz's petition for common law marriage on summary judgment,
finding that Janice did not have enough evidence to support
her claim while at the same time disallowing her the
opportunity to engage in any discovery?

Standard of Review:

Upon review of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate «
court will apply the same standard as that applied by the
trial court. Durham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977);
Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies
litigants the benefit of a trial on the merits, the

appellate court must review the evidence and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the losing party, and affirms only where it appears there
is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact.
Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) . Further, since summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free
to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions.
v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
Citation:

Wineaar

Record

This issue was raised below at, R. 12, 16-18, 63-

64, 66-68, 126-28, 154-58, and during oral argument
(transcripts found in Record at 189-243.)
Issue #2:

Does the one-year statute of limitations

serve as a bar to Janice's petition, where such petition was
commenced within one year of the termination of her marriage
to the decedent, and also within one year of the date on
which she learned of the fraudulent marriage between the
decedent and Lynne Kunz?

Standard of review: This issue

involves a question of law.

On appeal, questions of law are

reviewed de novo under the correction of error standard of
review, and appellate courts will accord no particular
deference to the lower court's conclusions.
2

United Park

City Mines Co, v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885
(Utah 1993).

Record Citation:

Issue #3:

R. at 155-56, 201-02.

Does the mere act of obtaining a marriage

certificate bar an interested party from attacking the
marriage as fraudulent?
above.

Record Citation:

Standard of review: See issue #2
R. at 14-15, 35-36, 46, oral

argument transcripts (R. at 189-243,

passim).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The following authorities are either 'determinative of
this appeal, or are of such central importance to merit
their inclusion herein:
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (validity of marriage not
solemnized).
Utah R. Civ. P. 7 (motion practice).
Utah R. Civ. P. 12 (motion to dismiss).
Utah R. Civ, P. 56 (summary judgment).
A copy of the foregoing authorities is attached hereto
at Addendum A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case:
This appeal is from an Order of the Third District

Court, Salt Lake Department, Honorable Sandra N, Peuler
presiding, dismissing on summary judgment Janice Kunz's
petition for judicial declaration of common law marriage,
concluding that the decedent Richard Kunz was already
legally married to a different party, Lynne Kunz, thereby
precluding the possibility of finding a valid marriage
between Janice and Richard.

B.

Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below:
On April 6, 2004, Janice Kunz (hereinafter "Janice")

filed a verified petition for judicial declaration of common
law marriage, seeking an Order declaring her the common law
spouse of Richard Kunz ("Richard"), who passed away on July
9, 2003.

Two parties were served with a copy of the

petition, to wit: Lynne Kunz, an individual claiming to be
the decedent's legal wife; and, Lillie Spencer, a purported
"spiritual wife" of the decedent, who was never legally
married to him.
Before Janice was able to serve the petition on the
4

decedent's personal representative, Lillie Spencer filed a
motion for summary judgment or to dismiss on April 19, 2004,
Acting in concert with Spencer, and using the same counsel,
Lynne Kunz filed her own motion for summary judgment,
reasserting the same arguments raised in Spencer's motion.
After counsel for Janice filed an affidavit seeking an
opportunity to engage in discovery, the matter was heard at
oral argument on September 17, 2004.

The domestic court

commissioner then issued a recommendation, concluding that
the matter would be treated as a motion for summary judgment
and that the motion would be granted in favor of Lillie
Spencer and Lynne Kunz (hereinafter sometimes collectively
referred to as the "appellees").
Thereafter, on September 24, 2004, Janice timely filed
an objection to the commissioner's recommendation, coupled
with a request for oral argument.

Appellees subsequently

filed a response to Janice's objection on October 8, 2004,
and later submitted an affidavit in support of attorney fees
on November 8, 2004.

Janice filed a motion to strike the

attorney fee affidavit on November 9, 2004.

Shortly

thereafter, Judge Peuler issued an Order on November 16,
2004, upholding the commissioner's recommendation of summary
5

judgment dismissal and denying Janice's request for oral
argument. '
On March 3, 2005, a hearing was held before the domestic
court commissioner on the issue of attorney fees.

Following

the hearing, the commissioner issued a recommendation
denying attorney fees.

Appellees objected to the

recommendation, and the matter was therefore presented to
Judge Peuler for a decision.

On March 24, 2005, Judge

Peuler entered an Order denying the objection and upholding
the commissioner's recommendation.

Janice then commenced

the instant appeal on April 20, 2005.

No prior or related

appeals have been taken.

C.

Statement of Facts:
1.

Janice and Richard Kunz were married in the Salt

Lake Temple on June 18, 1953.
ever been married.
2.

Previously, neither party had

(Verified Petition, 1 4 (Record at 2)).

Thereafter, the parties became followers of the

doctrine of plural marriage, and in 1961 they divorced in
order to allow Richard to marry another spouse, Rachel Kunz,
in a civil ceremony.
3.

(R. at 2, 11*5-6.)

Despite Janice and Richard's divorce, the two
6

continued to reside together, hold property together, and
otherwise acted as if they were married.
4.

Rachel Kunz subsequently passed away in

approximately May of 1994.
5.

(R. at 2, 1 8.)

Thereafter, Janice and Richard continued to reside

together as common law husband and wife.
6.

(R. at 2, 55 6-7.)

(R. at 2, 1 7.)

Sometime later, Richard took another spiritual

wife, Lillie Spencer, but he did not legally marry her.

(R.

at 2, 1 9; Affidavit of Janice Kunz, 1 8 (R. at 22)).
7.

On or about September 17, 1999, -Richard purported

to marry another individual, Lynne R. Kunz, in a secret
civil ceremony, with a marriage license and certificate
issued.
8.

(R. at 2, 1 10; R. at 22, 1 9; R. at 46.)
At the time of his marriage to Lynne, Richard was

already common law married to Janice.
9.

(R. at 2, 1 11.)

The marriage to Lynne was done in utter secrecy,

without Janice's knowledge.

(Affidavit of Janice Kunz, 1 9

(R. at 22); Affidavit of Viroque Kunz, 55 3-4 (R. at 46)).
It was done as a matter of expediency and as a favor to
Lynne, to allow her—a British citizen--to remain in the
country on an expiring visa.

(R. at 35-36, 55 10-14; R. at

46, 51 3-4)) . Lynne was already the plural wife of a
7

different husband, Andrew Williams, but she was unable to
legally marry him because he had already taken a legal wife.
(Affidavit of Debbie Darger, M

11-12 (R. at 35-36);

Affidavit of Viroque Kunz, 13-4 (R. at 46)).
10.

Following their "civil union", Lynne did not

cohabit with Richard, nor did the couple hold themselves out
as husband and wife, nor did they hold property together,
nor did they have children together.
Darger, If

(Affidavit of Debbie

11-14 (R. at 35-36); Affidavit of Janice Kunz, 11

9-10 (R. at 22)).
11.

By contrast, Janice and Richard continued to reside

together, and held themselves out as husband and wife and
acquired a general reputation in the community as married.
This situation existed from June 18, 1953, through July 9,
2003, when Richard passed away.

(Verified Petition, M

12-

14 (R. at 2-3); Affidavit of Janice Kunz, II 6, 11-12 (R. at
22-23)).
12.

Janice and Richard had two children together during

their marriage.
13.

(Verified Petition, 1 15 (R. at 3)).

Janice and Richard held property together jointly

during their marriage.

(Affidavit of Janice Kunz, If 6, 11-

12 (R. at 22-23)).
8

14.

On June 18, 2003, the date of Janice and Richard's

50th wedding anniversary, Lillie presented the couple with
an anniversary card, congratulating them on their golden
anniversary.

The card reads in pertinent part: "Richard and

Janice[,] God Bless You on Your Golden Anniversary."

(Id.,

1 13 (R. at 23)).
15.

Richard died on July 9, 2003, at age 68.

(Verified Petition, 5 2 (R. at 1)). Lynne attended his
funeral, but not as his surviving widow.

Instead, she

attended the funeral with her real husband, Andrew Williams,
along with Andrew's other wife, Teresa.

The funeral log

shows them signing in as follows: "Andrew, Lynne & Teresa
Williams."

(Attachment to Affidavit of William P. Morrison

of 6/2/04 (R. at 71)).
16. At the grave site, Andrew Williams made some
remarks about Richard, stating that he had done a lot for
Andrew's family, his wives, and himself.

Andrew made these

comments with his wife Teresa on one arm, and his other wife
Lynne on the other.

(Affidavit of Viroque Kunz, 34 (R. at

46)) .
17.

Janice filed her verified petition for judicial

declaration of commmon law marriage on April 6, 2004.
9

(R.

at 1.)

Service of process of the verified petition on Lynne

was accomplished by way of service on Andrew Williams at a
common address-

(Affidavit of William P. Morrison of

2/2/04, 1 12 (R. at 67); Constable's Affidavit of Service,
R. at 48)). Lynne has not contested the validity of such
service-

passim.)

(See Court Docket,

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Janice is the only party entitled to legal recognition
of her marriage to Richard.

From the date of the couple's

legal union in the Salt Lake Temple in 1953, continuing for
the next fifty years until the time of Richard's death in
July of 2003, the parties resided together, held property
together, had children together, and held themselves out and
acquired a reputation in the community as husband and wife.
By contrast, the secret marriage of Richard and Lynne
was nothing other than a sham.
expediency, nothing more.

It was a marriage of

At no time did these two

individuals ever reside together, have children together,
hold property together, file taxes together, or hold
themselves out as husband and wife and establish a
reputation as such in the community.
10

Rather, their union

was simply undertaken to allow Lynne to remain in the
country on an expiring visa.

This so-called marital union

was a fraud when it was undertaken, and it remains a fraud
to this date. There is no basis in law or fact to uphold
the marriage, nor to afford it any legal recognition.

This

Court should therefore reverse the lower court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the appellees, and reinstate
Janice's petition forthwith.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISPOSING OF THIS
CASE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is not a case that should have been decided on
summary judgment.

The issues involved in this case are

factually unique, and are believed to be matters of first
impression.

Such issues do not lend themselves well to

summary disposition.

On summary judgment, the law must be

well settled in favor of the moving party, and the moving
party must show the nonexistence of any genuine issues of
material fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In the instant case,

the law is not well settled, and the fundamental issue in
the case is sharply disputed, to wit: whether Lynne is the

11

surviving widow of the decedent, or whether such title
properly belongs to Janice.

In light of the foregoing, it

was imprudent for the lower court to dispose of this case on
summary judgment.

As the following discussion will

demonstrate, the lower court granted summary judgment in
error, and this Court should therefore reverse the lower
court's decision and remand this case for further
proceedings.

A.

Two Critical Errors Were Committed Below,
Each of Which Warrants Reversal

It is submitted that the domestic court commissioner
made two fundamental errors in granting summary judgment
below, which errors were perpetuated by the lower court.
First, the commissioner improperly weighed the evidence,
choosing to disbelieve the claim made by Janice in her
affidavit that she did not know of Lynne's marriage to
Richard until after Richard had passed away.

Second, the

commissioner improperly concluded that Janice lacked the
requisite evidence to show the invalidity of Lynne's
marriage to Richard, while at the same time denying Janice
the opportunity to obtain additional evidence through the

12

process of discovery.

Both of these errors warrant reversal

of the lower court7s decision.
The first error shows that the lower court did not
properly follow the law in entering summary judgment in
favor of the appellees.

On summary judgment, it is not the

proper role of the court to weigh the evidence.

Instead,

the role of the court is to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party-

Wineaar v. Froerer

Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); Canfield v. Albertsons,
Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah App. 1992).

As stated by

the United States Supreme Court: "The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are
to be drawn in his favor."

Anderson v. American Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (U.S. 1986) (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the domestic court commissioner
improperly weighed the evidence.

Instead of believing

Janice's evidence, which showed that Janice was unaware of
the purported marriage between Richard and Lynne until after
Richard's death (Affidavit of Janice Kunz, 1 9 (Record at
22)), the commissioner viewed this evidence skeptically.
This is clear from two statements made by the commissioner
during oral argument.

The first statement is reported at
13

page 216 of the Record, wherein the following remark is
made: "Then somewhere around 1999 we get Lynn and Richard.
Supposedly Janice doesn't know about it.
marriage."
added)).

It's a secret

(R. at 216 (Addendum C, at 28:19-20) (emphasis
The commissioner's use of the word "supposedly"

shows marked skepticism on her part as to the truthfulness
of Janice's affidavit.
The second indication of the commissioner's disbelief of
Janice's evidence is found at pages 223 and 224 of the
Record, wherein the the following exchange is reported:
THE COURT: [Tjhere were a few facts that I
wanted to get clear. Janice didn't know about
the marriage to Lynn, supposedly, until the
log—the funeral log, if I recall. They never
knew each other? They never knew each other—
never met?
MR. MORRISON: I can't say for certainty
whether that's true, but I don't—
THE COURT: She has resided with Richard
every day, every moment?
MR. MORRISON: When you say "she" you m e a n —
THE COURT: Janice.
MR. MORRISON: —Janice.
THE COURT: Every day, every moment since
really their marriage?
MR. MORRISON: Not totally correct because
14

hefs also split part of his time with Lillie
Spencer, so I don't want to mislead the Court
on that,
THE COURT: Okay- So Lillie Spencer signed
the marriage certificate with Lynn, and so how
would he not—how would she not know? Did
these—they never talk, Lillie and Janice never
talk, and they wouldn't have mentioned this
little certificate that has Lillie's name on it
where he's spending half of his time?
(Record at 223-24 (copy attached hereto at Addendum C, at
31-32, LL 15-26, 1-12) (emphasis added)).
Here, we clearly see the commissioner weighing the
evidence, and effectively disregarding the allegation made
in Janice's affidavit that she knew nothing of the Lynne and
Richard wedding until after Richard had died.

Janice cited

this improper weighing of the evidence in her objection to
the commissioner's recommendation, but the lower court did
nothing to rectify the matter.

Instead, the lower court

summarily affirmed the commissioner's grant of summary
judgment without a hearing.
reversal in and of itself.

This was improper, and warrants
See Webb v. McGhie Land Title

Co., 549 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1977) (summary judgment is a
drastic action, not favored except in those rare instances
where a trial on the merits would be fruitless); Brandt, v.
Soringville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460 (Utah 1960) (stating
15

that because summary disposition denies litigants the
benefits of a trial, courts are, and should be, reluctant to
invoke the remedy); Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah
1982) (same).
The second fundamental error that was made below
concerns the lower court's refusal to allow Janice to engage
in any discovery.

This is important, because the lower

court made a ruling that cut against Janice with a double
edged sword.

The court ruled that Janice did not have

sufficient evidence to support her claim that Lynne's
marriage to Richard was a fraud, while at the same time
barring Janice from obtaining additional evidence to support
her claim through the process of discovery.
At oral argument, the domestic court commissioner
hammered this matter home.

She stated in her ruling:

"Looking at all of the facts, the petitioner was married and
then subsequently divorced from the decedent, Mr. Kunz, and
she wants that declared now to be a common law marriage,
which on its face I have to invalidate the certified copy of
the marriage between Lynn and Richard in 1999. To do that
there has to be clear and convincing evidence that that was
fraud.

I don't have—that is a higher level.
16

It is just

under a criminal standard.

I don't have that level.

doesn't rise to that level.

It

I can't see that I shouldn't

grant the summary judgment because on its face and the
documents presented, the evidence presented is there is a
valid marriage."

(Record at 228 (Addendum C, at 36:11-22)

(emphasis added)) .
Janice timely submitted an objection to the
commissioner's recommendation, asserting in part that
discovery should be allowed before a ruling was entered on
the summary judgment motion.

How else could Janice hope to

prove, by the commissioner's standard, that a fraud occurred
by "clear and convincing evidence"?

Yet the lower court

overruled Janice's objection and upheld the commissioner's
recommendation, concluding that further discovery was
unnecessary.
272)).

(Order of November 16, 2004, at 1 (Record at

This was clear error.

Under Utah law, it is generally not appropriate for a
court to rule on a pending summary judgment motion until
after the deadline for discovery cutoff has passed, because
information may be learned through discovery sufficient to
defeat the motion.

Such was the holding in Auerbach's, Inc.

v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977) and Downtown
17

Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.),
denied,

765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).

cert,

Notably, these cases was

decided before the adoption of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The rule of law laid down in these cases
is even more apropos now, because Rule 26 strictly prohibits
parties from engaging in any discovery until after the
parties have held an attorney's planning meeting and have
submitted a case management order, which does not occur
until after an answer is filed, Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d).
In this case, counsel for Janice cited to the Horman
decision and requested that no ruling on the pending summary
judgment motion be made until after the parties had
conducted discovery.

In addition, counsel filed an

affidavit requesting an opportunity to engage in discovery.
Among other things, the subject affidavit stated that
written discovery requests were needed, as well as several
depositions.

Counsel requested an opportunity to depose

Lillie Spencer, Lynne Kunz, and Andrew Williams. Counsel
also stated that discovery was particularly necessary on the
validity of the solemnized marriage between the decedent and
Lynne Kunz.

Since this marriage was done in utmost secrecy,

not much information was available about the same, thus
18

warranting the need for discovery.

Further, counsel stated

that discovery needed to be conducted on the issue of
Lynne's marriage to Andrew Williams.

Such matter was

relevant because of its bearing on Janice's claim that
Lynne's marriage to Richard was a sham, inasmuch as she was
already married to someone else.
The domestic court commissioner refused to allow any
discovery.

Such ruling was upheld by the lower court, which

concluded that "further discovery was unnecessary."
of 11/16/04; R. at 272.)

(Order

This ruling was.entered in error.

It was simply not appropriate for the lower court to have
resolved this matter on summary judgment, without affording
Janice an opportunity to engage in any discovery.

Such

result is unsound and contrary to law,. Not only is it
contrary to the Horman case, but it is also contrary to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Where, as here, the court

elects to treat a Rule 12(b) (6) motion as a motion for
summary judgment, each party must as a matter of law be
afforded an opportunity to present all material evidence to
the court that is relevant to the motion.

Rule 12 provides

in pertinent part: "If, on a motion asserting the defense
number (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a
19

claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."

Utah R. Civ. P.

12(b) (emphasis added).
The lower court's entry of summary judgment in favor of
the appellees, without affording Janice the opportunity to
engage in discovery and present all pertinent and relevant
evidence to the court, runs afoul of the law and must be
overturned.

This Court should therefore reverse the lower

court's decision, and remand this case for further
proceedings.

B.

Janice's Petition Was Timely Filed within
One Year of the Date on which Her Marriage
to Richard Was Terminated

There is no basis for concluding that Janice's petition
was untimely filed-

Under Utah law, petitions for judicial

declaration of common law marriage must be commenced within
one year of the date on which the marriage relationship
terminated.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2).
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In the instant

case, Janice's marriage to Richard was terminated by his
death in July of 2003.

Her petition was filed in April of

2004, well within the one year limitation period.
Therefore, her petition was timely filed.
Appelleesf may attempt to claim that Lynne's solemnized
marriage to Richard in September of 1999 ended Janice's
common law marriage to him, thus rendering her petition
untimely when it was filed in April of 2004.

This argument,

however, is unavailing, because Lynne fraudulently concealed
her marriage to Richard.

Under Utah law,•it is well settled

that acts of fraudulent concealment toll the statute of
limitations.
2001)•

Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271,

(Utah

In the instant case, Janice has asserted that

Lynne's marriage to Richard was a fraud, which was concealed
from the public.

The evidence before this Court shows that

such marriage was undertaken in utmost secrecy, and was done
not to effectuate a valid marriage but to try to skirt
immigration laws and allow Lynne to remain in the country on
an expiring visa.

The evidence further shows that Janice

knew nothing of the Lynne and Richard marriage until after
Richard had passed away.

Under Utah law, these facts are

sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, at least
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until Janice discovered the fraud or, through the exercise
of reasonable dilligence, should have discovered it.
Indeed, this is the law laid down by the Utah Supreme Court
in Hill/ a case in which appellees' counsel served as an
attorney of record.
Based upon the foregoing, the statute of limitations on
Janice's petition did not begin to run until she discovered
the fraudulently concealed marriage of Lynne and Richard.
This discovery was not made until after Richard had passed
away, according to Janice's affidavit.

Since Janice's

petition was commenced within one year of the date of
Richard's death, the petition was timely filed under any
factual scenario.

Hence, the statute of limitations does

not provide a sound basis for upholding the dismissal of
Janice's petition.

This Court should therefore reinstate

the petition and allow it to proceed on its merits.

II. JANICE'S MARRIAGE TO RICHARD IS THE ONLY
MARRIAGE ENTITLED TO LEGAL RECOGNITION
Everything that appellees have done in this case has
been geared toward prevailing on procedural grounds, not on
the merits.

Instead of submitting an answer to Janice's
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petition, appellees have filed a motion for summary judgment
or to dismiss.

Instead of allowing some discovery to be

taken before seeking a ruling on their motion, appellees
have opposed Janice's request for discovery.

Instead of

submitting a detailed affidavit supporting the validity of
Lynne's marriage to Richard, appellees have tendered a terse
affidavit from Lynne, seeking to uphold the form of a paper
marriage certificate over the substance of a valid marriage.
On appeal, appellees have continued their pattern of
advancing form over substance, procedure over merit.

Once

again, we see every effort being made to attack Janice's
appeal on procedural grounds, not on its merits.

This is

evident by the two motions for summary disposition that
appellees have already filed, seeking a premature resolution
of this appeal without reaching the merits of the case.

The

only fair inference to be drawn from appellees' actions is
that they are afraid of the merits of this case, which do
not support their position.

Indeed, the merits

overwhelmingly favor Janice.
For a period of over 50 years, Janice has dutifully
stood at Richard's side as his friend, companion and spouse.
During this time, she resided with him, held property
23

jointly with him, had children with him, and held herself
out as his wife.

Her union with Richard bears all of the

stamps and indicia of a valid marital relationship.

By

contrast, what evidence has Lynne offered to show a valid
marital relationship with Richard?
than a scrap of paper.

Nothing more substantive

Consider her affidavit, and its

woeful silence as to any indication of a valid marriage to
Richard.

Does the affidavit allege any period of courtship

with Richard?

No.

Richard?

Does it allege that any children were born of

No.

their union?

No.

Does it allege any cohabitation with

Does it allege that the parties held any

property jointly together?
of any joint tax returns?

No.
No.

Does it allege the filing
Does it allege any honeymoon

being undertaken after the parties married?

No.

Does it

allege any holding out by the two as husband and wife?

No.

Does it allege the establishment of a reputation in the
community as that of husband and wife?

No.

In its silence, the affidavit of Lynne Kunz actually
tells the real story.

It speaks of immigration fraud.

speaks of marriage fraud.

It

It speaks of a fraud on the

court.
Unfortunately for Lynne, the law does not provide any
24

legal recognition of sham marriages-

The definition of a

sham marriage is one that is undertaken in jest for an
unlawful purpose, with no intent by the parties to establish
a life together.
Cir. 1985),

United States v. Yum, 776 F.2d 490 (4th

Such marriages have always been improper, but

have recently come under great scrutiny and widespread
attack as being a huge source of abuse with respect to
immigration laws.

In this arena, sham marriages are

undertaken to allow an immigrant to enter or remain in the
country and receive priority for permanent residency status.
Id. Again, this is unlawful. A sham marriage is a fraud
marriage, and the parties thereto are subject to severe
criminal penalties.

See, e.g., Lutwak v. United States, 73

S.Ct. 481, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); Yum. 776 F.2d at

;

United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2nd Cir. 1945),
cert,

denied

326 U.S. 766 (1945); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154,

1184, 1186a (1994) (Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of
1986).
In this case, Janice has alleged that the marital union
of Lynne and Richard was a sham.

It was a sham from the

outset, done for an unlawful purpose.

It was undertaken for

the sole and express purpose of allowing Lynne, a British
25

citizen, to remain in the country on an expiring visa.

The

marriage ceremony itself was done in utmost secrecy, and
following the ceremony there was no cohabitation by the
parties nor an intent to remain together as husband and
wife.

This by its very definition is marriage fraud.

As

stated by author Ilona Bray in her legal treatise, FIANCE &
MARRIAGE VISAS:

A COUPLE'S GUIDE TO U.S. IMMIGRATION (3rd ed. 2005),

"[a] sham marriage is one that is entered into in order to
get around the U.S. immigration laws.

For a marriage to be

valid under the law, it is not enough that the couple had a
real marriage ceremony and got all the right governmental
stamps on their marriage certificate.

They have to intend

to live together in a real marital relationship following
the marriage ceremony—and prove their intention through
their actions." (Emphasis added) (excerpted at Addendum D)).
The marriage certificate that Lynne and Richard obtained
may have been real, but their purported martial union was
not.

At all times material herein, Lynne was already the

putative plural wife of Andrew Williams.

She had no intent

to marry Richard, other than to obtain a piece of paper
allowing her to remain in the country and defraud the United
States.

Janice is the real spouse and widow of the
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decedent, and her marriage to Richard is the only one worthy
of legal recognition.

This Court should therefore reverse

the lower court's dismissal of her petition, and reinstate
the same forthwith.

CONCLUSION:
Based upon the foregoing, Janice respectfully asks this
Court to reverse the lower court's entry of summary judgment
in favor of the appellees.

The lower court dismissed

Janice's petition for common law marriage' in error.

This

Court should therefore reverse the lower court's decision,
and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this

2.2-** day of

(%^cy^jLst

2005.

MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.

Wp [VW^^r^William P. Morrison
Grant W. P. Morrison
Attorneys for Appellant
Janice R. Kunz
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM A

30-1-2.1

H1LSM/VMIIAMI) WtKK

M-1 -? 1. Validation of marriage to a person subject to
chronic epileptic fits who had not been sterilized.
All marriages, otherwise valid and legal, contracted prior to
the effective date of this act, to which either party was subject
to chronic epileptic fits and who had not been sterilized, as
provided by law, are hereby validated and legalized in all
respects as though such marriages had been duly and legally
contracted in the first instance
i %3
30-1-2.2. V a l i d a t i o n of i n t e r r a c i a l m a r r i a g e s .
All interracial marriages, otherwise valid and legal, contracted prior to July 1,1965, to which one of the parties of the
marriage was subject to disability to marry on account of
Subsection 30-1-2(5) or (6), as those subsections existed prior
to May 14, 1963, are hereby valid and made lawful in all
respects as though such marriages had been duly and legally
contracted in the first instance.
1996
30-1-2.3. Validation of m a r r i a g e t o a p e r s o n w i t h acq u i r e d immune deficiency s y n d r o m e o r o t h e r

sexually transmitted disease.
Each marriage contracted prior to October 21,1993, is valid
and legal but for t h e prohibition described in Laws of Utah
1991, Chapter 117, Section 1, Subsection 30-1-2(1) regarding
persons afflicted with acquired immune deficiency syndrome,
syphilis, or gonorrhea, is hereby valid and made lawful in all
respects as though that marriage had been legally contracted
in t h e first instance.
1996
30-1 -3. Marriage in belief of death, or divorce ol former
spouse — Issue legitimate.
When a marriage is contracted in good faith and in t h e belief
of the parties t h a t a former husband or wife, then living and
not legally divorced, is dead or legally divorced, t h e issue of
such marriage born or begotten before notice of the mistake
shall be the legitimate issue of both parties.
' 1953
*M I L Validity of foreign marriages — E x c e p t i o n s .
A marriage solemnized in any other country, state, or
territory, if valid where solemnized, is valid here, unless it is
a marriage:
(1) that would be prohibited and declared void in this
state, under Subsection 30-1-2(1), (3), or .(5); or
(2) between parties who are related to each other
within and including three degrees of cransangiiinity,
except as provided in Subsection 30-1-1(2),
1996
30-1-4.1. M a r r i a g e r e c o g n i t i o n policy.

(1) (a) I t is the policy of this state to recognize as marriage
only the legal union of a man and a woman as provided in
this chapter.
(b) Except for the relationship of marriage between a
m a n and a woman recognized pursuant to this chapter,
this state will not recognize, enforce, or give legal effect to
any law creating any legal status, rights, benefits, \>r
duties that are substantially equivalent to those provided
under Utah law to a man and a woman because they are
married.
(2) Nothing in Subsection (1) impairs any contract or other
rights, benefits, or duties that are enforceable independently
of this section
>
2004
30-1-4.5. Validity of m a r r i a g e n o t solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this
chapter shall be legal and valid if' a court or administrative
order establishes that it arises out of a contract between a
man and a woman who:
(a) are of legal age stnd capable of giving consent,
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under t h e provisions of this chapter;

(c) have cohabited,
(r\) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligalillll , 111ll

v

u I n liii hold themselves out as and have acquired a
1111111 H 111 Jtad general reputation a s husband a n d wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section m u s t occur during the relationship described
in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination
of t h a t relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable
under this section may be manifested in any form, and m a y be
proved under t h e same general rules of evidence as facts in
other cases.
2004
30-1-5, Marriage solemnization —• Before unauthorized person — Validity.
(1) A marriage solemnized before a person professing to
have authority to perform marriages shall not be invalidated
for lack of authority, if consummated in the belief of t h e
parties or either of tjiem tfyat he had authority a n d t h a t they
have been lawfully married.
(2) This section m a y not be construed to validate a marriage that is prohibited or void under Section SO-1-2,
2001
30-1-6. Who m a y s o l e m n i z e m a r r i a g e s — Certificate.
(1) Marriages m a y be solemnized by the following persons
only:
(a) ministers, rabbis, or priests of any religious denomination who are:
(i) in regular communion with any religious society; and
(ii) 18 years of age or older;
(b) Native American spiritual advisors;
(c) the governor;
(d) mayors of municipalities or county executives;
(e) a justice, judge, or commissioner of a court of record;
(f) a judge of a court not of record of the state;
(g) judges or magistrates of the United States;
(h) the county clerk of any county in the state, if t h e
clerk chooses to solemnize marriages;
(i) t h e president of the Senate;
(j) the speaker of the House of Representatives; or
(k) a judge or magistrate who holds office in U t a h when
retired, under 1 rules set by the Supreme Court.
(2) A person authorized under Subsection (1) who solemnizes a marriage shall give to the couple married a certificate
of marriage that shows the:
(a) name of the county from which the license is issued;
and
(b) date of the license's issuance.
(3) As used in this section:
v
(a) "Judge or magistrate of the United States" means:
(i) a justice of the United States Supreme Court;
(ii) a judge of a court of appeals;
(iii) a judge of a district court;
(iv) a judge of any court created by an act of
Congress t h e judges of which are entitled to hold
office during good behavior;
(v) a judge of a bankruptcy court;
(vi) a judge of a tax court; or
(vii) a United States magistrate.
(b) (i) "Native .American spiritual advisor" means a
person who*
(A) (I) leads, instructs, or facilitates a Native
American religious ceremony or service; or
(II) provides religious counseling; and
(B) is recognized as a spiritual advisor by a
federally recognized Native American tribe.
(ii) "Native American spiritual advisor" includes a
sweat lodge leader, medicine person, traditional religious practitioner, or holy man or woman.
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New trial.
Provision that notice of hearing on motion be
served not later than five days before the time
specified for the hearing does not apply to
motion for new trial and such notice is not
integral part of motion for new trial; rule does
not change procedure whereby a motion can be
called up at any time parties desire to do so.
Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d
275 (1960).
—Compliance with rule.
Actual notice.
The trial court may dispense with technical
compliance with the five-day notice provision oi
Subdivision (d) if there is satisfactory proof that
a party had actual notice and time to prepare tc
meet the questions raised by the motion.
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423,519 P.2d 236
(1974); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794
R2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992).
Ineffective notice.
Eight days' notice of trial was ineffective to
give five days' notice when notice was by mail,
since Saturday, Sunday, and three days for
mailing were (to be deducted from eight-day
period. Mickelson v. Shelley, 542 P.2d 740 (Utah
1975).
Time to prepare.
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by two-day notice of hearing to release property subject to
writ of attachment where he had adequate time
to prepare for hearing and defendant was required to post cashier's check in lieu of security.

Rule 7

Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236
(1974). * '
—Continuance.
Surprise.
Neither plaintiff's failure to serve motion for
continuance five days before date set for hearing nor failure to file afBdavits accompanying
motion justified denial of motion where plain-'
"iff's counsel did not learn of reason for plainaff's inability to appear at hearing in time to
nake motion five days before hearing and Rule
10(b) does not* expressly require affidavits to
accompany motion for continuance. Bairas v.
Fohnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962).
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299,
241 R2cl 462 (1952); Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah
Id 52, 337 P.2d 429 (1959); Western States
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58,
504 P.2d 1019 (1972); Connelly v. Rathjen, 547
R2d 1336 (Utah 1976); Genuine Parts Co. v,
Larson, 555 P.2d 285 (Utah 1976); McEwen
Irrigation Co. v. Michaud, 558 P.2d 606 (Utah
1976); Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978);
Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Utah DOT, 589
P.2d 782 (Utah 1979); Albrecht v. Uranium
Servs., [nc, 596 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1979); Ute-Cal
Land Dev. v. Inteimountain Stock Exch., 628
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981); Bennion v. Hansen, 699
P.2d 757 (Utah 1985); KO. v. Denison, 748 P.2d
588 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); P & B Land, Inc. v.
Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991);
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367
(Utah 1996); Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT
90, 54 R3d 1153.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 20 et
seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders
§ 10; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 114-117,
227-229.
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 8;
66 CJ.S. Notice § 27 et seq.; 71C. J.S. Pleading
§§ 98, 114, 219; 72 CJ.S. Process §§ 72, 78.
AJL.R.—yafcating'judgment or granting neV
trial in civil case* consent as ground of after
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute
or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to
timely prosecute action, 15 AL.R.3d 674.

Validity of service of summons or complaint
on Sunday or holiday, 63 AL.R.3d 423.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Comsequences of prosecution's failure to file
timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 A.L.R.4th
213.
Whait constitutes bringing an action to trial
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid
dismissal under state statute or court rule
requiring such activity within stated time, 32
A.L.R.4th 840.

PART BDL PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to commissioner's order.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim;
a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.

Rule 7
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(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall" be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial of in proceedings before a court
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the
grounds for the relief sought.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting
memorandum. Within ten days after service of thte motion and, supporting
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in
opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition,
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a
proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument
without leave of the court. Eeply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of
argument without leave of the court.
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex
parte application and a showing of good cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the
responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials,
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pajges of argument shall contain
a table of contents and a ifable of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery
materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision"The request to submit for decision
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was^
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request,
the motion will not be submitted for decisioh.
I
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion'. A party may
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively
decided.
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(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order fonthe payment
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or
without notice. Orders shall state whether they' are entered upon trial,
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the.court, the prevailing
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity witli the court's decision. Objections to
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
preparing the order shall file the proposed' order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of
a court commissioner is the order of the court unfed modified by the court. A
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made
in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement,
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion.
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note.—The practice
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not
regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that
party's motion, memoranda and supporting
documents and, if so, when and where to deliver them.
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just
orders upon motion.
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amendment deleted denominated as such" after
"counterclaim" in Subdivision (a); rewrote Subdivisions (b) and (c); and added Subdivisions (d)
to(g).
The 2004 amendment inserted "or in proceedings before a court commissioner" in Subdivision (b); substituted the first paragraph in
Subdivision (c)(2) for a list of maximum lengths
for different types of memoranda; in Subdivision (f)(2), substituted ^serv'e upon the other
parties" for "file" in the first sentence and added
the last sentence; in Subdivision (g), substituted "recommendation" for "recommended order" several times and substituted "made in
open court" for "entered" and added the clause
beginning "or, if" in the second sentence; and
added the second paragraph of the Advisory
Committee Note.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 7, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. —Amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence, motion for,
U.R.C.P. 15(b).
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3.
Consolidation of defenses made by motion,
UR.C.R 12(g).

Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13.
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12.
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.P.
12(i).
Directed ve rdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for, UJR.C.P. 50.
Dismissal of actions, U.R.CJP. 41.
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of
complaint in, § 78-34-6.
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P.
43(b).
Execution and proceedings supplemental
thereto, U.R.C.P. 69Aet seq.
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B.
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required,
§ 78-36-9.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. *
/ "Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a).
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2.
Partition of property, complaint to set forth
interests of all parties, § 78-39-2.
Pleading special matters, TIR.C.P. 9.
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P. 60.
Requirements, of signature, U.R.C.P. 11.
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and
other papers, ILR.C.P. 5.
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P.
65B(a).
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 782-4.
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside,
U.R.C.P. 65A.
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P.
6(d).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
Comment Note — General principles regardin Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — ing imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, FedAttorney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342.
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed.
Case Law Development* I. Appellate Review 107.
and Procedure, 1998 Utah L. Rev. 585.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, FedBrigham Young Law Review. - Curbing eral Rules, of Civil Procedure peii^ning to
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is f&j** and verification of ple^admgs, in actions
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 579.
for defamation 95 AX.R. Fed 181
^i T_- TV
Ai.
• n- -i T -^^.i-:
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fedw ^ ^ ^ f ^ r T f ^ T n ^ r ? »^07
*™l ™<* ° f <*& Procedure, perteinig to
W e * Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L Rev. 597.
^ ^ ^ ^ v e r i f i c a t i o n o f pleadiSgsJnSoa
Note, AppeUate Review of Rule 11 Issues . ^ ^
^ . ^
baa
empioyment> 9 6
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v. \ T p -ped 13
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Rule 12, Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service
of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state.
A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different tim$ is fixed by
order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a
pleading doe^s /not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims:
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days
after notice of the court's action;
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the
more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to
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which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that'claim
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Ri*Le
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial oil application of any party, unless the court orders
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems
just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses
and objections then avyailable which this rul^ permits to be raised by motion,
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a
waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the_ court shall order the
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plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentahty, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file, undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to, file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 12, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Motions generally,
U.RC.P. 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
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Motion for judgment on pleadings.
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—Matters outside of pleadings.
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—Waiver.
Rights of opposing party.
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—Purpose.
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Delay.
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P.3d 633.
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—Fraud.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
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Motion for judgment on the pleadings to
Affirmative defenses.
decide upon distribution of trust assets was
Divorce.
inappropriate in a proceeding among trust benElection of remedies.
eficiaries to determine distribution and offsets.
Failure to state claim upon which relief Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d
can be granted.
233, aflTd, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148.
General and special appearances.
—Matters outside of pleadings.
Statute of frauds!:
Venue.
-Answers to interrogatories.
—When presented.
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of
Amended answer.
the pleadings for purposes of judgment on the
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.
pleadings and if l i e court considers them the
—Failure to file.
other party must have the privilege of offering
Standard of review.
answering affidavits as upon a motion for sumStatute of limitations.
mary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. ^.
Summary judgment.
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953).
—Conversion of motion to dismiss.
Rights of opposing party.
—Court's discretion.
On review of a motion on the pleadings
—Court's initiative.
treated as a motion for summary judgment
—Defenses.
under Subdivision (c), the party against whom
—Opportunity to present pertinent material.
the judgment has been granted is entitled to
—Preclusion.
have all the facts presented, and all the inferIssues of fact.
ences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a
Waiver of defenses.
light most favorable to him. Young v. Texas Co.,
—Defect of parties.
8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958).
—Defective service of process.
—Exceptions.
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Subject matter jurisdiction.
When issues raised.
—Bill of particulars.
—Failure to join indispensable party.
A motion for a more definite statement, and
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of th6 action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary
judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law, A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and i^ good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When^ a motion for summa^ judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amendment substituted "move for summary judg-

ment" for "move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment m his favor"

ADDENDUM B

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
In re the Marriage of:
ORDER
JANICE RIRIE KUNZ and RICHARD
L. KUNZ (deceased).

CASE NO. 044902035
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER

On September 17, 2004, Commissioner Susan C. Bradford granted
Lynee Kunz and Lillie

Spencerfs

Motions

For Summary

Judgment

thereby dismissing petitioner Janice Kunz's "Verified Petition For
Judicial Declaration Of A Common Law Marriage."
brings

the

matter

before

this

Court

Commissioner Bradford's recommendation.

on

her

Now, petitioner
objection

to

Specifically, petitioner

contends that issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Commissioner
Bradford

and

declines

to

accept

Mr.

Morrison's

Rule

56(f)

affidavit. The Court finds, with respect to the legal matters at
issue, further discovery is unnecessary. Furthermore, with respect
to her pending motion, petitioner requests oral arguments.

Such

request is denied as oral arguments were heard before Commissioner
Bradford, and this Court has fully considered the transcript of
that hearing.
Now, after consideration of the pending motion and relevant

IN THE MATTER OF
KUNZ

PAGE 2

legal authorities, the Court

ORDER

affirms Commissioner

Bradfordfs

September 17, 2004, recommendation granting summary judgment. The
Court reaches this conclusion based upon the fact that even if the
decedent Richard Kunz and petitioner Janice Kunz had a common law
marriage, their alleged "union" was never legally defined as such
prior to his 1999 marriage to Lynne R Kunz.
30-1-4.5.

See, Utah Code Ann.

Additionally, after 1999, Mr. Kunz, did not have the

ability to consent to a common law marriage with Janice Kunz
because he was legally married to Lynne R Kunz.
For these reasons petitioner's objection is hereby denied and
Commissioner Bradford1s recommendation is affirmed.
This is the final Order of this Court and no further Order is
necessary.

Dated this

Ho
day of November, 2 004.
BY THE COURT:

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER, to the following, this
2004
Ronald Barker
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84115-3692
Grant W Morrison
William P Morrison
Morrison & Morrison
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

{&

Day of

(\3f) (/

/

FUiflO!S?II@TCOI2I7
Third Judicial District

Grant W. P. Morrison (3666)
William P. Morrison (7587)
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-7999
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774

MAR 2 ^ 2095
3ALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
In re the Marriage of:
JANICE RIRIE KUNZ and RICHARD
L. KUNZ (deceased).

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENTS'
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Civil No.: 044902035
Judge: PEULER
Commissioner: BRADFORD

This matter came on for a hearing before Commissioner
Bradford on March 3, 2005, at 9:30 a.m., on Petitioner's Motion
to Strike Respondents' Affidavit in Support of Attorney Fees.
Petitioner was represented at the hearing by her attorneys, Grant
W. P. Morrison and William P. Morrison.

Respondents were

represented at the hearing by their attorney, Ronald Barker. The
Court having considered the pleadings on file and the arguments
of counsel, and having been fully advised in the premises, now
for good cause showing hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as
follows:
1.
untimely.

Respondents' request for attorney fees is denied as
Respondents' request has not been presented to the

Court in the form of a technical motion for attorney fees.

Instead, the request was presented by way of an affidavit in
support of attorney fees, and as part of respondents' initial
motion for summary judgment-

The motion for summary judgment was

heard and adjudicated by Commissioner Bradford on September 17,
2004, at which time the Commissioner made a recommendation that
did not award attorney fees to either party.

Respondents did not

timely file an objection to the recommendation, which was
subsequently affirmed by the Court on November 16, 2004, in an
Order that was deemed a Mfinal Order".

The proper vehicle for

presenting respondents' request for attorney fees was in the form
of an objection to the Commissioner's recommendation of September
17, 2004.

Because respondents did not timely file an objection

to the recommendation, they are now time-barred from doing so.
2.

Section 30-3-3 of the Utah Code does not apply to this

proceeding, because this is not an action to establish an order
of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case.

Instead, this is simply an action

to seek the judicial declaration of a common law marriage.
3.

No attorney fees shall be awarded to either party.

DATED this

dtf

/)/[ajL£M-

day of

/ 2005.

BY THE COURT:

SANDRA N. PEULER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

2

RECOMMENDED BY:
SUSAN C. BRADFORD
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER

Approved as to form:

Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Respondents

Date

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This certifies that on the
*/-f*•» day of
VV\^'LI>
,
2005, I caused to be mailed, first-class and postage-prepaid, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Order Denying
Respondents' Request for Attorney Fees to the following:
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Respondents
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
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ADDENDUM C

-1IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF,
Case No. 044902035
RICHARD L. KUNZ,

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
September 17, 2004''
'

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE SUSAN BRADFORD
Third District Court Commissioner

APPEARANCES
For the Petitioner:

WILLIAM P. MORRISON
MORRISON & MORRISON
352 E. 900 S.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-7999

For the Respondent:

RON BARKER
2870 South State St.
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Telephone: (801)486-9636

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT

1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Teiephone: (801) 377-0027
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But from the time that he married the last person before he died,

2

some four-and-a-half years, she couldn't have filed either

3 I administratively or in the Court seeking to have that marriage or
4

that relationship declared to be a valid common law marriage.

5 I

So having lost the ability to do so, and a time limit

6 J being fixed by statute, the only sensible construction is that
7

when the right to sue stopped the statute started.

8

her right to sue to have her marriage declared valid as a common

9

law marriage, the statute of limitations had to start then,

10

That's got to be the latest.

11

dispositive in the case.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BARKER:

14

THE COURT:
I

15
16

I think that's

Okay.
Thank you.
Thank you.
/

MR. MORRISON:

Mr. Morrison?

Thank you, your Honor.

I'll stand ijf

that's allowed.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. MORRISON:

19

That's (inaudible).

When she lost

Certainly.

Thank you, sir.

Just remain at this table.

There's a

fundamental flaw in the respondent's argument, and that is this:

2 0 J they're claiming that she should have filed it more timely,
21

immediately or within one year after Lynn Kunz purported to marry

22

Richard, the decedent?.

23

The flaw in that argument is in our affidavit we lay

24

out —

this is in Janice Kunz's affidavit that we've submitted to

25

the Court, paragraph 9 of that affidavit, "It was only after my
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husband passed away that I found out about his purported marriage

2

to Lynn Kunz."

3

This was so secretive that nobody knew about it.

One, we've since found out that one of Mr. Kunz's

4

children was advised of that marriage, but nobody else knew about

5

it.

6

THE COURT:

So you're saying she had no idea?

7

MR. MORRISON:

8

right.

9

off of, no notice of.

How could she do this?

That's exactly

She can't do something that she has no information to go
It's not as if they were moving in

10

together, opening up joint bank accounts, filing joint tax

11

returns.

12

The whole thing was a sham from the very beginning.
What they're attempting to do is perpetrate a fraud

13

upon the State of Utah by going out and getting this marriage

14

certificate and passing that off as a valid marriage.

15

right in our affidavit.

16

that, but that is a key issue in this case.

17

I don't —

That's

apparently they've missed

Our client cannot undertake an action that she doesn't

18

know that she's supposed to undertake.

19

that I'd like to make.

That's the first point

20

Just continuing on with those thoughts—

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me ask you a question on that.

22

Let's assume 'for a moment that Mr. Kunz is alive and that he has

23

10 plural wives- and they all walk out the same day, and they all

24

come into court and they file for a common law marriage.

25

many common law marriages can the Court find?

How
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MR. MORRISON:

There's only one valid marriage allowed

in Utah.

3

THE COURT:

That's correct.

So how do I find in this

4

particular case we have a decedent, we have purportedly a

5

marriage certificate, your client or Janice is divorced.

6 I not argued.
7

They divorced.

Everyone

agrees they divorced.

8
3

No one disputes that fact.

That's

Now unless that's a fraud you can't have it both ways.
You can't claim marriage is fraud and divorces are fraud and

10

everything in this case is a fraud that's happened in 50 years.

11

They married, they divorced, and then supposedly they have lived

12

together all along, but there's another marriage in here, and she

13

has just supposedly found out about that and doesn't think it's

14

valid.

15 I

She thinks it's a sham marriage.
So you're saying Lynn perpetrated for these three-a;nd-

16

a-half years this sham marriage and your client didn't do

17

anything —

18

know about it until when?

19

didn't know about it, couldn't do anything.

MR. MORRISON:

Until after the funeral was held,

20

after —

21

is based on the evidence that is before the Court—

22

this isn't in evidence before the Court.

THE COURT:

Didn't

It: was after.

All I can say

I realize I'm asking you

23

these questions, and again, I'll make the decision whether it's a

24

12(b) or a motion 56, and I've asked Counsel also questions that

25

may go beyond the parameters, but that's because I'm very curious
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about the facts of this case, and maybe you can fill in details

2

for me.

3

MR. MORRISON:

We would like to do that.

4

to reach the merits of the case at some point.

5

have other questions on that particular issue?

6
7
8
9

THE COURT:

No.

Did —

We would like

Did the Court

are you challenging that the

marriage license is valid?
MR. MORRISON:

We're disputing the validity of Lynn's

marriage to Richard.

10

THE COURT:

But is the marriage license invalid?

11

MR. MORRISON:

I think it's invalid to the extent that

12

she's not capable of marrying somebody else.

13

pleadings that she was already married to another individual,

14

Andrew Williams.

15

THE COURT:

I think there are divorce documents on

16

Andrew; is that correct?

17

divorce documents on Andrew?

18
19
20

We assert in our

MR. MORRISON:

Do you dispute the validity of the

These type of arrangements are very

unique, as the Court understands.
THE COURT:

They are unique.

I see that Counsel —

we

21

at least have a sense of humor knowing that the factual scenario

22

is unique.

23
24
25

MR. MORRISON:

There's an effort here to try to avoid

running afoul of criminal law.
THE COURT:

That's right, because it's a bigamy issue,
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and if they're skirting one issue and asking for the relief on

2

the other, it's like we want to perpetrate a fraud over here, but

3

we want our cake and eat itr too.

4

around that.

5
6

I mean it does circle all

We all see that.

MR. MORRISON:
are before the Court.

That's correct.

These are the facts that

We've introduced a document —

the funeral

7 I log that shows that Lynn Kunzr her name appears on that log.
8

There's an entry there for Andrew, Lynn and another plural

9

spouse, Teresa Williams.

10

Not signed as Lynn Kunz, instead

Andrew, Lynn and Teresa Williams.

11

THE COURT:

But you would —

you're not making the

12

argument that we can have three or four or five common law

13

marriages.

14

you've clearly stated that.

15
16
17

You're saying there can only be one, and I think that

MR. MORRISON:

That's right, your Honor.

correct.
THE COURT:

So your client also stated in an affidavit

18

that he spent his time between Lillian and Janice.

19

precedence as to the common law between them?

20
21

That's

MR. MORRISON:

So who takes

Our claim came first out of anybody, so

we're first in line.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MS. MORRISON:

I think that is important because we just

24

have a new precedent from the Utah Supreme Court that just barely

25

came dawn, State of Utah vs. Thomas Arthur Green just recently
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handed down on September 3rd, 2004 where they did address the

2

common law marriage aspect—

3

MR. BARKER:

4 I

MR. MORRISON:

5 I fifth floor.
6

Citation?
You can get a copy of it just on the

Itfs too new to have a citation, but it is docket

No. 20010788.

7

MR. BARKER:

8

MR. MORRISON:

9

THE COURT:

10

What is the title of the case?
State of Utah vs. Thomas Arthur Green.

What} is the holding- in /that case?

MR. MORRISON:

A number of holdings.

He was declared

11

guilty.

12

With respect to the common law marriage aspect, they allowed the

13

State to file a petition to have him judicially declared married

14

to one of these plural spouses, and the spouse that he was

t

His conviction on the charge of bigamy was affirmed.

I

15

married to was the fir^t in line.

He had some previous spouses

16

that had divorced him, and those were actual legitimate divorces.

17

They parted ways.

18

could be some distant relationship with these parties here.

That left this individual, Linda Kunz —

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MORRISON:

that

We may be in that case before we're done.
It would not surprise me.

But

21

effectively that's what the Court did is they allowed the Court

22

to enter a civil finding of a common law marriage with respect to

23

the first spouse in line.

24
25

THE COURT:

Tell me, in that factual case was there any

wife afterwards that had a valid marriage license?
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MR. MORRISON:

2

THE COURT:

Not that I'm aware of.

So that we're comparing factually similar

3

cases, because in this case one of the key factual issues is that

4

marriage license to Lynn.

5

MR. MORRISON:

6

THE COURT:

That's—
I mean a critical factual issue, and I want

7

to know if the Court overlooked a marriage solemnized, or at

8

least in our particular case, a marriage license that was granted

9

by the clerk of the court, that the officiating officer that

10

signed it it's —

11

doing this kind of ceremony if they're illegally marrying people.

12

Likewise, the fraud that would be committed by that that goes to

13

that.

14
15

they are criminal charges that go to the person

So in that particular case there was no standing
marriage that needed to b e —

16

MR. MORRISON:

17 I

THE COURT:

Not that I'm aware ,of.

—taken aside and declared a sham or

18

whatever, like we're trying to do in this case.

19

scenario.

20

have exactly the same factual scenario, and it seems that the

21

difference is in this case you have this marriage with Richard to

22

Lynn that occurred inv'19 99.

I just want to make sure that I'm not —

23

MR. MORRISON:

24

THE COURT:

25

A different
that we don't

I just don't know if it's —

They divorced —

1992,she divorced Andrew.

she divorced —

in 1991 or
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MR. MORRISON:

2

THE COURT:

On paper, at least.

Well, arguably all these people could live

3

in one big commune, but for the State's purposes, I can only have

4

one person married at a time.

5

know, 800 people all in one big group, but I can only legally

6

ascertain —

7

only be one marriage.

8

civilly declared marriage, there can only,be one between —

9

two .people at any given time as husband and wife.

I mean they could be living, you

and I'm grateful that both attorneys agree there can
Whether that's a common law marriage or a
or

So that we do

10 I agree on.
11

MR. MORRISON:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. MORRISON:

14

before the Court has finished.

15

THE COURT:

We do.

Gratefully.
And I didn't mean to —

No, that's okay.

I keep jumping in

I had a question on that,

16

and it's appropriate to bring it up and make me aware of it.

17

Thank you.

18

MR. MORRISON:

Just to respond to the Court's question

19

on this Green case, I am not aware of an actual solemnized

20

marriage that was overlooked in favor of the first marriage.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. MORRISON:

23
24
25

Okay.

I d o n ' t know i f i t ' s s p e l l e d out.

I

just—
THE COURT:

I d o n ' t know i f i t i s , e i t h e r .

address *that, Counsel.

I d o n ' t know.

I couldn't
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2

MR. MORRISON:

It's a fairly lengthy opinion, over 20

pages long.

3 I

THE COURT:

Okay.

4 I

MR. MORRISON:

My father was involved in this case, just

5

assisting the lead Counsel, John Bucher, since he had some

6

problems with the bar.

My father was asked to step in and heip

7 j with oral argument, but I am not aware of all of the facts in
8

that particular case.

9

THE COURT:

10

Okay.

MR. MORRISON:

Thank you.

Just a couple of more things to touch on.

11

I appreciate the Court being fully aware of all of the pleadings

12

and having read through everything.

13

Spencer, we have an acknowledgment from her —

14

an exhibit that we have introduced.

15

card.

With respect to Lillie
and this is again

This is a happy anniversary

Just so it's right at the top of the Court's fingertips,

16 I may I present another copy to the Court?
17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BARKER:

Certainly.
We don't dispute the date.

(Inaudible) for

19 j purpose of this motion.
20

THE COURT:

Couldn't it be possible that a lot of people

21

in polygamy setting could have 30'h wedding anniversaries and 50r-h

22

wedding anniversaries and 45r-h wedding anniversaries all

23

coinciding at various times?

24

MR. BARKER:

25

THE COURT:

Well, sure.
In that realm where they have spiritual
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marriages.
MR. MORRISON:

2

The point we' re trying to make on that

3

is Lillie is here trying to contes t the validity of Janice's

4

marriage to Richard, and here she is acknowledging it, jus;t less

5

than a year ago.

6

year, but June 18th,. 2003.

7

anniversary, Richard and Janice.

8

love, Lillie."

9

that we need to introduce.

"God bless you on your golden
Happy anniversary with lots of

That just goes toward the holding out evidence

MR. BARKER:

10
11

Or at this point now .It's been a little over a

We don't dispute that for purposes of this

motion.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

MR. MORRISON:

Mr. Morrison, anything further that—

What we're looking for is some kind of an

14

indicia of an actual marriage between Lynn arid Richard.

15

in their affidavit.

16

file from Lynn Kunz.

17

doesn't say how long they courted before they decided to marry.

18

It doesn't 'say that they cohabitated after their marriage.

19

doesn't say they had children together, had joint bank accounts,

20

joint vehicles, joint real estate.

21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

It's not

Instead we get a very scarce affidavit on
It doesn't say how she met Mr. Kunz.

It

It

But would they have done this marriage for

purposes to skirt bigamy charges?
MR. MORRISON:

I think they did the marriage to skirt

the immigration problem that Lynn was facing.
THE COURT:

Oh, so it does have a purpose.

Isn't that
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done every day in"the United States by many, many people?

2

MR. MORRISON:

I think it's investigated.

If it is

3

intentionally done strictly for that reason, I believe that can

4

be set aside as an unlawful marriage.

5

I'm not an expert on that.

6

THE COURT:

7

skirt immigration laws for —

8
9

Okay.

MR. MORRISON:
expired visa.

That's my understanding.

So the purpose for this one was to
was it Lynn?

For Lynn.

Her husband —

She was here on a soon-to-be-

her actual husband, Andrew

10

Williams, already had a solemnized marriage, apparently, to

11

another individual, Teresa.

12

log.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. MORRISON:

15

Uh-huh.
So he could not marry her and get hear

to remain in the country.

16

THE COURT:

That's the other name on the funeral

Mr. Kunz offered a helping hand.

Well, but she was divorced from Andrew some

17

time —

I mean it looks like five years prior.

18

these thin'gs.that was hatched' overnight.

19
20

MR. MORRISON:

It wasn't one of

Is that right?

That's what we've got as far as the

evidence.

21

THE COURT:

I mean from what I'm looking at, they got a

22

divorce in 1992 in England, and Lynn and Richard get married in

23

1999.

24

what you're saying?

25

run out?

Was she in England at the time of their marriage?

Is that

Or she was here and her visa was about to
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2

MR. MORRISON:
was about to expire.

3

THE COURT:

He married her for that reason and do you

4 I know any other reason?
5

MR. MORRISON:

10

We'd like to do some discovery.

If it's

disputed how can we resolve it on summary judgment?

8
9

And Lynn is saying something to the

contrary, I guess.

6
7

She .was in the United States and her visa

THE COURT:

Tell me, do you think that the documents

I guess it comes down to this.

—

Do the documents on their face,

do we take them as prima facia evidence of what they are, or do

11 I we go behind them and say, "Well, if they perpetrated a fraud,
12

why didn't she perpetrate a fraud?

She did a divorce, didn't

13

marry and allowed this to happen."

At what point do we call the

14

fraud on anyone that's perpetrated the fraud and allow them to

15 I get the benefit of that?

At what point is the fcraud called if

16

what they're all doing is skirting all the laws so that they can

17

perpetrate their religious beliefs and really call what it is as

18 la fraud.
19
20
21

MR. MORRISON:

That's a good question.

Somebody is

entitled the be the spouse, and that's what we have to determine.
THE COURT:

So at what point does the Court say, "If

22 I you're going to try and perpetrate a fraud then we're going to go
23

by what you have —

the documents that you have done.

We will

24

not let you continue to perpetrate frauds on the Court, and you

25

will be held to the standard.

If you enter a marriage, you're
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held to that marriage.

2

divorce."

3

to start?

4

If you get a divorce you're held to that

How do we know which fraud —

MR. MORRISON:

where to stop and where

I would respectfully submit that my

5

client out of any of the parties is the least to blame and has

6

not committed any fraud.

7

We're not trying to set aside that divorce.

8

have her determined to be the common law spouse.

9

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

10

MR. MORRISON:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. MORRISON:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BARKER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BARKER:

17
18

Her divorce —

Other questions from the Court?

No.
We'll g<s ahead and submit it, your Honor.

Okay.

Thank you.

Sure.
Even if, as they claim, she didn't know

about the third marriage—
THE .COURT:

Let's say she didn't know about the marriage

20

log and is shocked to find this out.

23
24
25

Mr. Barker?

Very briefly if I may respond.

to Lynn, and it was only at his death —

22

We're seeking to

That's fair.

19

21

we can recognize that.

MR. BARKER:

she's reading a funeral

Let's assume that's true, and for purposes

of the motion I guess we have to assume that.
THE COURT:

Let's assume that, because we must assume it

in a light most favorable,
MR. BARKER:

Right, but the second marriage, she surely

-26knew about that 14-year marriage or whatever it was.
THE COURT:
MR. BARKER:
THE COURT:
MR. BARKER:

The one with Rachel?
Rachel, yeah.
Okay.
She can't contend that she's still married

to himr or that she has a common law marriage—
THE COURT:
MR. BARKER:
THE COURT:

During their marriage, no.
No.
But technically she could try and get it

declared from the time after Rachel t o —
MR. BARKER:

She could have done, and of course, what we

really come down to is is the Court going to inquire as to why
people marry?

If we start doing that we open the door that

we'd be in the mire.

No marriage would be sa'fe.
i

Court to inquire as to why Richard married Lynn.

—

They want the

Well, he

married her, and they stayed married four-and-a-half years.
During that time if the plaintiff had decided that she
wanted to have a valid marriage, she could have asked him to
marry her, or, she could have asked that the Court declare that
their relationship be a common law marriage.
She waived her rights.

She didn't do it.

She just sat on her rights for 50 years.

Another thing I think we need to consider is the
statute.
repose.

It's not a statute of limitations; it's a statute of
It says must.

It's a statute of repose.

It can't be

tolled because you didn't know, which is what their affidavit is
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trying to do.

2

the year.

3

It's a statute of repose.

They didn't file within

They're absolutely barred.

As the Court said, these are official documents.

4

They're undisputed.

They haven't challenged any of them.

All

5

they're saying is that, "We think that because there's a funeral

6

log signed by some unknown person," that may create inference

7

that they were going by different names that somehow it's not a

8

valid marriage because the name Williams was used and she had

9

been divorced from him for five years.

That's so highly

10

speculative that it doesn't come to the muster required for a

11

56(f) affidavit.

12
13
14

THE COURT:

Well, people get divorced and keep old names

and remarry, too.
MR. BARKER:

Well, of course they do.

The fact thajt if

15

she signed this anniversary card, we don't know if she's talking

16

about a legal marriage or a religious marriage.

17

THE COURT:

Mr. Morrison, let me ask you a question.

18

Is your client seeking a common law marriage back to when?

19

about Rachel's marriage and then a death?

20

a marriage for that time period?

21

MR. MORRISON:

22

through just because—

23
24

THE COURT:

What

Is she trying to claim

I haven't really thought that issue

Because itrs really been touched on.

It's

saying wait a second, she married, they divorced, and then he

25 I marries Rachel.

We've got Rachel, and they're arguably married

-281

to Rachel.

Now if she's trying to go back 50 years, how does

2

she eviscerate Rachel's marriage?

3

married to Rachel?

4

Rachel's marriage and her subsequent death, at least for the time

How does that one happen?

5 I period of those 14 years.
6

How can you be common law
How do we take out

So it couldn't have occurred right

there, unless you're arguing that that one wasn't valid either.

7 I

So arguably we could take it back to Rachel's death,

8

assuming they all lived together as one big happy family for 50

9

years.

10

Let's assume that for just the sake of argument.
The law can only recognize one, so we have the first

11

nine years or so with Janice.

12

years.

13

you have —

14

Then Lillie —

Then we go to Rachel for about 14

and there's never really a marriage that

either of you have told me that is recognized or

solemnized by the State of Utah.

That was arguably either a

I

i

15 I common law marriage with the two of them, or with your client,
16

Rachel is out of the picture.

17

married to Richard that has been established by the law within

18

one year anywhere in that time period.

19

But there's no one that's really

Nothing gets established.

Then somewhere around 1999 we get Lynn and Richard.

20

Supposedly Janice doesn't know about it.

21

I guess we could find out Richard is married to lots of other

22

people that we don't know about, too.

23

possible, but for our purposes we do have this marriage

24

certificate.

25

It's a secret marriage.

That's conceivably

Your client is claiming no, it was a fraud on her.

Is
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1

it a fraud on her?

Didn't Lynn and Richard have the capacity to

2

enter into any relationship they wanted to?

3

challenge if they want to enter into a marriage?

4

that to take away property?

5

Janice?

6

affected, why wasn't Janice in court?

7

logically think this through, so if you will bear with me in time

How can she
Did they do

Did they do that in some way to ha rm

How were Janice's rights affected, and if they were
I'm just trying to

8 I how this would really pan out, what does this really mean?
9

I see that you're both —

you're sort of smiling and

10

nodding because you see the horns of a dilemma too.

11

see it.

12

deceased, and Janice either wants to go back to her divorce in

13

1961 or her marriage in 1953 and say, "I have standing over all

14

others, including Rachel and that marriage, including Lynn and

So it's —

I'm sure you

we're now to the point where Richard is

15 I that marriage, and whatever common law marriage might have been
16

the case with Lillian or if there's a question with Lillian now,

17

the two of us can battle it out, and according to the Green case

18 I I'm first in line.
19

I'm the common law marriage."

have that right?

20

MR. MORRISON:

21 I

THE COURT:

22

Do I basically

(Inaudible).

According to your client's argument, that's

what she's seeking, and according to Mr. Barker's client's

23 I argument, a marriage is a marriage, a divorce is a divorce, and
24

you can only have one marriage going at one time between one man

25 I and one woman according to Utah law.

Anything else is bigamy.
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So we have documents that show the marriage and the

2

divorce with Janice.

There was an intervening time period where

3

Janice, if she was there, could have gotten a common law marriage

4

truly, but he married Rachel.

I don't think anybody is claiming

5 I he didn't marry Rachel.

No one has told me they weren't married,

6

and then they divorced —

or actually she died, and that lasts

7

for about 14 years.

8 I
9

Then we have the relationship with Lillian, which was
never solemnized in any kind of legal sense, and then we have the

10

marriage in 1999 to Lynn.

Janice wants those all taken out, and

11

Mr. Barker is saying can't do.

12

says they were married.

13

one, and she has passed the time period for a common law marriage

We have a legal document that

For that purpose she can't now undo that

14 I because they were married, and you're saying can't do because she
15

didn't know about it.

16

Okay.

Have I missed anything?

If I have, just let me know.

I mean'basically

17

factually.

I just want to make

18

sure I -- I think I have your arguments, I think —

I hope

19 I correct.
20

MR. BARKER:

The one thing you didn't mention is our

21

argument is that the last marriage has the strong presumption,

22

and I've got a whole series of research on it, if the Court would

23

like.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BARKER:

Okay.
I haven't read the Green case.

I don't
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2

know if that (inaudible) or not
THE COURT:

Certainly for purposes of common law,

3

they're saying the first one if there's a string of people, if

4

there is no valid marriage in the Green case.

5

MR. BARKER:

6

devoted to this.

7

difficult.

8
9

It's obviously you're worked hard on it.

THE COURT:
not going.

We really appreciate the time you've
It's

Quite frankly, I can tell you one place I'm

I'm not going to do a 12(b) (6).

I think if anything

10

it moves to the —

11

alone it's generally discouraged to do 12(b) (6) motions, and I

12

think both attorneys know that.

13

That's really a hard one to leap to.

14

12(b) (6) motion.

15

motion, a summary judgment, to be quite honest.

16

a summary judgment area.

On the petition

The law is quite clear on that.
So I'm not inclined to do a

I would be looking at this more as a 56(f)'

The question for me is do I have any genuine issue as to

17

a material fact.

18

because if there's even one issue that is disputed that could

19

potentially be disputed that requires that scrutiny, then it must

20

be given in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, which

21

would be Mr. Morrison and his client.

22

If I do then it's appropriate to do discovery

What I'm going to do is take a five-minute break and go

23

sort out in my mind what you have told me,,*because I think that's

24

appropriate, but you know I'm not going to do a 12(b)(6).

25

not going to go there.

I'm

It's a question of the summary judgment
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and whether there is any genuine issue of fact that is in

2

dispute.

3

that.

4

think you know that, too.

That is the only issue, and I think it comes down to

That's where we're at, and both attorneys are nodding.

5

MR. BARKER:

6

THE COURT:

I

Very good.
So with that, give me five minutes while

—

7

because I want to sort out in my mind what you have told me here

8

and sort of digest it, and T t-.hinlr ynn wnnlri appreciate more a

9

decision right now today because no matter what I do you will

10

object to it —

11

with Judge Peuler shortly that way, which it deserves, and I

12

respect that you would do that.

13

some side will object to it, and you will get it

It is appropriate that you zealously represent your

14

client no matter who does that objection.

15

right now I'd tell your but I want to go and think it through and

If j knew in my mind
i

i

16
17
18

deal with it, and then I'll be right back «*<-» t-.iiat- T direst- i tclearly for me.

Thank you.

(Nothing further on disc)
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1

MR. BARKER:

2

THE COURT:

Very good.
So with that, give me five minutes while

—

3

because I want to sort out in my mind what you have told me here

4

and sort of digest it, and I think you would appreciate more a

5

decision right now today because no matter what I do you will

6

object to it —

7

with Judge Peuler shortly that way, which it deserves, and I

8

respect that you would do that.

some side will object to it, and you will get it

It is appropriate that you zealously represent your

9
10

client no matter who does that objection.

If I knew in my mind

11

right now I'd tell you, but I want to go and think it through and

12

deal with it, and then I'll be right back so that I digest it

13

clearly for me.

Thank you.

14

(Short recess taken)

15

THE COURT:

(Court already in session when recorder was

16

turned on) a couple more questions because I —

17

facts that I wanted to get clear.

18

marriage to Lynn, supposedly, until the log —

19

if I recall.

20

other —

21

Janice didn't know about the

They never knew each other?

the funeral log,

They never knew each

never met?
MR. MORRISON:

22

true, but I don't—

23

THE COURT:

24

there were a' few

I can't say for certainty whether that's

She has resided with Richard every day,

every moment?

25

MR. MORRISON:

26

THE COURT:

When you say "she" you mean—

Janice.
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MR. MORRISON:

2

THE COURT: Every day, every moment since really their

3

—Janice.

marriage?

4

MR. MORRISON:

Not totally correct because he's also

5

split part of his time with Lillie Spencer, so I don't want to

6

mislead the Court on that.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

So Lillie Spencer signed the marriage

8

certificate with Lynn, and so how would he not — how would she

9

not know?

Did these —

they never talk, Lillie and Janice never

10

talk, and they wouldn't have mentioned this little certificate

11

that has Lillie's name on it where he's spending half of his

12

time?

13

MR. MORRISON:

That's a good question. We're in

14

litigation right now with Lillie Spencer as far as —

15

trust agreement that we're looking at, but I can't really answer,

16

that question.

17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

MR. MORRISON:

19
20

there's a

Other than what we've got presented as

far as the evidence before the Court up to this point.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Morrison, I'm going to tell you

21

what — or ask you, tell me what disputed facts there are that

22

needs more discovery.

23

want to go behind the marriage of Lynn and Richard and find out

24

why, why they married?

25

MR. MORRISON:

26

Tell me what is really disputed.

Do you

We'd like to do some discovery in these

areas. We want to find out—

-33THE COURT:

If it's determined to be a valid marriage

where does that put your client?
MR. MORRISON:

If their marriage is valid then I think

we're done.
THE COURT:

I think so, too.

MR. MORRISON:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

So what do you need to know to know if

that's a valid marriage?
marriage license.

You've got a certified copy of a

On its face that's a prima facia case that

it's valid, arguably, prima facia case.

To prove some kind of

fraud you have a clear and convincing standard.

Tell me what you

need to know that you don't know.
MR. MORRISON:

I think we have a pretty good idea of

where we stand on the case, and I think we have a pretty goofcl
idea of the facts.

We would like an opportunity to look into a

couple of areas to flesh out the arguments that we've presented.
We want to have —

there's a lot of questions that the Court has

asked me that I can only speculate on today.

I would like to be

able to pin those down so I'm not just guessing.
THE COURT:

Arguably the time period —

Janice knew of

the marriage to Rachel?
MR. MORRISON:
THE COURT:

Yes, she did.

She couldn't possibly be claiming a common

law marriage either prior to Janice —

Rachel's death.

Couldn't

possibly.
MR. MORRISON:

I think we can go from at least back to

-341 I the date of her death.
2

THE COURT:

I think we're on safe ground there.

That would be —

in any possible realm she

3 J couldn't possibly be claiming before that time.
4

MR. MORRISON:

5 J the

Green

case

that

says

Only with respect to an interpretation of
you go back

to the first case

—

the

6 J first marriage.
7

THE COURT:

Then you have to knock out a valid marriage.

8

MR. MORRISON:

If it was valid to begin with.

If he's

9 I already married to somebody else then how can that be valid?
10

THE COURT:

But he's divorced.

He was divorced from

11 I your client, and that is acknowledged as an undisputed fact.
12

MR. MORRISON:

13

continued to be married to her.

14

THE COURT:

That's correct.

Okay.

He divorced her and

So in essence, it feels like I'm

15 I either tacitly approving polygamist relationships by allowing
16 I these common laws marriages, divorces, marriages, divorces to
17 I accumulate so that we don't have to count any of the marriages,
18

we just go back to the first one.

We allow that perpetration of

19 la fraud on the courts and society in favor of the first
20 I polygamist wife, disregarding alL of the fraud that had been
21 I committed since that time, and the tacit approval of the first
22

wife, correct?

23 J
24

MR. MORRISON:

Did the Court want me to respond to that,

or—

25

THE COURT:

If you would like.

26 I

MR. MORRISON:

I can see no reason to give any
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1

protection whatsoever to the marriage relationship between Lynn

2

Kunz and Richard Kunz.

3

living together as husband and wife, and for all of those reasons

4

we've presented prior in our initial presentation.

5
6
7
8
9

THE COURT:

Richard and Lillie up to the death.
MR. MORRISON:

THE COURT:

THE COURT:

15
16
17

I

But there was mutual cohabitations going on.

11

14

Well, there were separate residences.

want to keep that straight, b u t —

MR. MORRISON:

13

They weren't

But your client was cohabitating with

10

12

It wasn't a valid marriage.

Correct, pursuant to their—

But their cohabitation takes precedent over

the marriage?
MR. MORRISON:

Over Lynn's marriage, which was a sham

that we've asserted.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Is there anything further you would

like to say, Mr. Barker?
MR. BARKER:

I agree with the Court.

We've got to go by

18

the records, by the documents.

19

and inquire why did the people decide to marry, or why did they

20

decide not to marry.

21

have a solid foundation.

22

to rely on these documents unless someone comes in with clear and

23

convincing proof to show deprivement, and the person has to have

24

clean hands that does that, and they don't.

25
26

THE COURT:

We can't go behind a marriage

If we start doing that no marriage would
As a matter of public policy we've got

Thank you very much.

a recommendation in this matter.

Thank you.
I'm prepared to make

This is a motion for summary

judgment or to dis
least.

I have not had a case of this factual scenario ever

before, and it is —
entire system.

I don't know that it may be new to the

I can —

quite certain that might be the case

here in Utah.
6

So for our purposes here in the motion for summary

7 I judgment or to dismiss, and the question I've already told you
8

I'm not going to do the alternative 12(b)6 motion.

I'm entering

9

this as a motion for summary judgment, or rather I'm reviewing it

10 I as a motion for summary judgment.
11 I
12

Looking at all of the facts, the petitioner was married
and then subsequently divorced from the decedent, Mr. Kunz, and

13 I she wants that declared now to be a common law marriage, which on
14

its face I have to invalidate the certified copy of the marriage

15

between Lynn and Richard in 1999.

16

clear and convincing evidence that that was frapd.

17 I have —

that is a higher level.

18

standard.

19

level.

20

To do that there has to be
I don't

It is just under a criminal

I don't have that level.

It doesn't rise to that

I can't see that I shouldn't grant the summary judgment

21 I because on its face and the documents presented, the evidence
22

presented is there is a valid marriage.

There has been a valid

23

marriage since 1999 in this case, and I don't have anything that

24

stands in the way to show that it is not a valid marriage other

25 J than conclusary statements, which is not the test under a 56(f)
2 6 | matter, and so the motion for summary judgment is granted.
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You have 10 days to file an objection with Judge Peuler.

2

I appreciate your thoughtful arguments, your time.

3

well taken.

4

sides.

You have ably represented your clients on both

5

MR. BARKER:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BARKER:

8
9

They are both

Thank you.
Thank you.
We commend the Court for its careful

consideration.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

10

MR. MORRISON:

11

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Thank you, Mr. Morrison.

(Hearing concluded)
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C. Using a Fake Marriage to Come to the U.S.
It is illegal for anyone to get married solely for the purpose of getting, or helping someone to get,
permanent residence in the United States. There are stifffinesand possible jail terms for people who
are convicted of this crime. But we would be foolish not to address the fact that many people
attempt to fake a marriage to obtain a green card.
md If you are getting married for legitimate reasons, you can skip this section and continue
reading at Section D.
If you are considering a fake, or sham, marriage, you probably already know that what you are
planning is illegal. You should also know that this book is written with the assumption that you are
marrying for love, not for a green card. We are not going to give you any special tips on making a
fraudulent marriage look real. However, we will outline the risks for you.
1. What Is a Sham Marriage?
A sham marriage is one that is entered into in order to get around the U.S. immigration laws. For a
marriage to be valid under the law, it is not enough that the couple had a real marriage ceremony and
got all therightgovernmental stamps on their marriage certificate. They have to intend to live in a
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real marital relationship following the marriage ceremony — and prove their intention through their
actions. If the couple doesn't intend to establish a life together, their marriage is a sham. (For more
on what USCIS considers to be a real or bonafidemarital relationship for purposes of green card
eligibility, see Chapter 2, Section B.)
2. Will You Get Caught?
Detecting marriagefraudsis a top priority for USCIS. USCIS officers still quote a survey from the
1980s which found that up to 30% of marriages between aliens and U.S. citizens are suspect. That
survey has since been shown to be deeplyflawed,but its legacy lives on.
In order to detectfrauds,the immigration authorities require a lot of proof that a marriage is real,
including more documentation than for other family-based immigration applicants. They subject
marriage-based immigrants to a longer and more detailed personal interview and a two-year testing
period for couples who have been married fewer than two years.
The government will not normally follow you around or investigate your life beyond the required
paperwork and the interviews it always conducts. But it has the power to look deeply into your life if
the authorities get suspicious. Government inspectors can visit your home, talk to your friends,
interview your employers, and more. By requiring more of married couples than others, the
government has already set up a system that gives it a lot of information about whether your
marriage is real.
What is the U.S. governments view of a normal marriage? The statutes and regulations don't go into
detail on this, so the following comesfroma combination of court cases and attorneys' experiences.
According to USCIS, the normal couple has a fair amount in common. They share a language and
religion. They live together and do things together, like take vacations, celebrate important events or
holidays, and have sex and children. Normal couples also combinefinancialand other aspects of
their lives after marriage. They demonstrate their trust in one another by sharing bank and credit card
accounts and ownership of property, such as cars and houses.
The government requires applicants to prove that they share their lives in a way similar to what is
described above. Applicants do this by providing copies of documents like rental agreements, bank
account statements, and children's birth certificates. The government further tests the validity of the
marriage by talking to the applicant and usually to his or her spouse. Every marriage-based applicant
for a visa or green card (includingfiances),whether they are applying in the United States or
overseas, will have to attend a personal interview with a U.S. government official.
U.S. government officials have developed amazing talents for discovering fraud by examining what
look like insignificant details of people's lives. To ferret out lies, they have learned to cross-check
dates and facts within the application forms and between the application forms and people's
testimony.
EXAMPLE: Rasputin has married Alice, a U.S. citizen, in the hopes of obtaining a
green card. They submit an application for a green card in the United States. At
Rasputin's green card interview, the officer asks for his lull name, his address, and how
he entered the United States. Rasputin can't believe how easy this all is. The officer goes
on to ask for the dates of all of Rasputin's visits to the United States, the date of his
divorce from his previous wife and the dates of all of his children's births. Rasputin is
getting bored. Then the officer notices something funny. The date of birth of Rasputin's
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last child by his former wife is a full year after the date of their supposed divorce. The
officer becomes suspicious, and Rasputin and Alice are taken to separate rooms for
fraud interviews. They are examined in minute detail about their married lives. When
neither of them can remember what the other one eats for breakfast or what they did for
their last birthdays, the case is denied and referred to the local Immigration Court for
proceedings to deport Rasputin.
If a couple has been married for less than two years when the immigrantfirstreceives residency,
USCIS gets a second chance at testing the validity of the marriage. The immigrants in such couples
don't get a permanent green card right away. Instead, the law requires that theirfirstgreen card
expire after another two years. (The technical term is that the immigrant has "conditional residency.")
When the two years are up, both members of the couple mustfilean application for the immigrant's
permanent residency. They must include copies of documents showing that they are still married and
sharing the important elements of their lives. This form is mailed to a USCIS office. As USCIS
knows, it is extremely difficult for members of sham marriages to keep things together for a full two
years, even on paper. If the marriage appears to be a real one when the two years is up, the
conversion from conditional to permanent residency won't involve an intensive investigation — the
application process doesn't even include an interview if the written application looks legit.
EXAMPLE: Maria married Fred, a U.S. citizen, in order to get a green card. Fred was
afriendof Maria's, who simply wanted to help her out. Maria manages to get approved
by the consulate at her immigrant visa interview, and enters the United States. Because
their marriage is new, Maria is given two years as a conditional resident During those
two years, Maria overdraws their joint checking account three times. Fred gets angry
and closes the account. Maria has an accident with their jointly owned car and it goes to
the junk yard. Fred buys another car in his own name and won't let Maria drive it Fred
gets fed up and wonders why he got into this in thefirstplace. He falls in love with
someone else and insists that Maria move out. At the end of her two years of conditional
residency, Maria can't get Fred to answer her phone calls. In desperation, shefillsout
the application form on her own, fakes Fred's signature and lists his address as her own.
However, the only documents she can attach are the same bank account statements and
car registration she submitted to the consulate two years ago. USCIS checks the files
and notices this. They call her and Fred in for an interview. It's not long before the truth
comes out and enforcement proceedings are begun.
As you seefromthe examples above, people who enter into sham marriages most often trip
themselves up just trying to get through the standard process. It's not that USCIS can read people's
minds or that it spends all its time peeking into applicants' bedrooms. They simply catch a lot of
people who thought that a fake marriage was going to be easier than it really is.
References to the Immigration Laws in This Book
Throughout this book are references to the federal immigration laws that govern
immigration through marriage and to the regulations that describe how USCIS will
apply those laws to you. (They look like this: "I.N.A. § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1430(a)," or "8 C.F.R. § 316.5.") We include these references where we feel it is
important to indicate our sources for information and to help you research the
immigration laws on your own. See Chapter 17 for more detail on what these
references mean and how you can look them up.
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3. What Happens If You Are Caught
The law pretty much speaks for itself on what happens to immigrants who commit marriage fraud.
You can face prison, afineor both:
Any individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of evading any
provision of the immigration laws shall be imprisonedfor not more than 5 years, or
fined not more than $250,000, or both (I.N.A. § 275(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)).
The U.S. citizen or resident could also face criminal prosecution, includingfinesor imprisonment,
depending on the facts of the case. They are most likely to be prosecuted for either criminal
conspiracy (conspiring with the immigrant is enough; see U.S. v. Vickerage, 921 F.2d 143 (8th Cir.
1990)), or for establishing a "commercial enterprise" to get people green cards (see IN. A. § 275(d),
8 U.S.C § 1325(d)).
The extent to which these penalties are applied depends on the specifics of each case. The
government tends to reserve the highest penalties for U.S. citizens or residents engaged in major
conspiracy operations, such as systematically arrangingfraudulentmarriages. But that doesn't mean
that small-time participants in marriage fraud can count on a soft punishment — though most
immigrants will probably simply be deported and never allowed to return.
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